Hvorfor Taliban endnu ikke er blevet knust
Strategypage har en anmeldelse af bogen "Hunting Al Qaeda: A Take-No-Prisoners Account of Terror, Adventure, and Disillusionment"
..they discovered that the greatest obstacle they would face in Afghanistan would not be the heat, the difficult terrain, or the enemy, but the reluctance of their commanders to let them hunt the terrorists. Determined to make an impact, Beast 85 found ways to take the war to the enemy despite the choking bureaucracy that hindered them. If they failed, they risked death or capture. If they succeeded, they risked court martial.
Now the men of Beast 85, who came home in September of 2002, have published a memoir of their time in Afghanistan. Hunting Al Qaeda tells how Beast 85 was able to capture three senior Taliban leaders at a time when Task Force 11, the Pentagon’s super secret special operations task force in Afghanistan, could not manage to capture even one. Beast 85 also captured or destroyed 79,000 pounds of enemy weapons and munitions, which accounted for 80% of the material Coalition forces captured or destroyed during their time in Afghanistan. They might well have captured Mullah Omar, whose location they had learned of from a CIA agent, but could not get permission to launch a raid before their quarry had slipped away.
The liberation of Afghanistan was one of the most remarkable military campaigns in history. It was accomplished by highly trained teams of Special Forces operating in a difficult and dangerous country where they were forced to rely on their own initiative. But by May of 2002, when Beast 85 arrived on the scene, Afghanistan had become safe enough for a three star general and a vast horde of underemployed staff officers. This huge command apparatus, which oversaw only a few battalions of actual troops, busied itself with micromanaging Special Forces teams in the field. Every operation had to be approved by so many levels of bureaucracy that by the time it was launched, the target had moved on.
Things got even worse following Operation Full Throttle, a wretchedly planned raid that accomplished nothing and left scores of civilians dead when the Air Force mistakenly bombed a wedding party. Beast 85 participated in Full Throttle, and give a detailed account. (Including how Beast 85 was itself nearly annihilated by an overeager SEAL team.) After the public relations disaster of bombing civilians, the American command in Afghanistan became even more risk averse, and operations required such long approval times that their chance of success was virtually nil.
Det taler jo sådan set for sig selv.
Henrik
..they discovered that the greatest obstacle they would face in Afghanistan would not be the heat, the difficult terrain, or the enemy, but the reluctance of their commanders to let them hunt the terrorists. Determined to make an impact, Beast 85 found ways to take the war to the enemy despite the choking bureaucracy that hindered them. If they failed, they risked death or capture. If they succeeded, they risked court martial.
Now the men of Beast 85, who came home in September of 2002, have published a memoir of their time in Afghanistan. Hunting Al Qaeda tells how Beast 85 was able to capture three senior Taliban leaders at a time when Task Force 11, the Pentagon’s super secret special operations task force in Afghanistan, could not manage to capture even one. Beast 85 also captured or destroyed 79,000 pounds of enemy weapons and munitions, which accounted for 80% of the material Coalition forces captured or destroyed during their time in Afghanistan. They might well have captured Mullah Omar, whose location they had learned of from a CIA agent, but could not get permission to launch a raid before their quarry had slipped away.
The liberation of Afghanistan was one of the most remarkable military campaigns in history. It was accomplished by highly trained teams of Special Forces operating in a difficult and dangerous country where they were forced to rely on their own initiative. But by May of 2002, when Beast 85 arrived on the scene, Afghanistan had become safe enough for a three star general and a vast horde of underemployed staff officers. This huge command apparatus, which oversaw only a few battalions of actual troops, busied itself with micromanaging Special Forces teams in the field. Every operation had to be approved by so many levels of bureaucracy that by the time it was launched, the target had moved on.
Things got even worse following Operation Full Throttle, a wretchedly planned raid that accomplished nothing and left scores of civilians dead when the Air Force mistakenly bombed a wedding party. Beast 85 participated in Full Throttle, and give a detailed account. (Including how Beast 85 was itself nearly annihilated by an overeager SEAL team.) After the public relations disaster of bombing civilians, the American command in Afghanistan became even more risk averse, and operations required such long approval times that their chance of success was virtually nil.
Det taler jo sådan set for sig selv.
Henrik
posted by Henrik | 9:04 PM
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